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Abstract
The “privacy paradox” is the term used to describe the disconnect between
self-reported privacy value attributions and actions actually taken to protect
and preserve personal privacy. This phenomenon has been investigated in a
number of domains and we extend the body of research with an investigation
in the IoT domain. We presented participants with evidence of a specific IoT
device’s (smart plug) privacy violations and then measured changes in privacy
concerns and trust, as well as uptake of a range of behavioural responses. Our
Saudi Arabian participants, despite expressing high levels of privacy concerns,
generally chose not to respond to this evidence with preventative action. Most
preferred to retain the functionality the smart device offered, effectively choosing
to tolerate likely privacy violations. Moreover, while the improved awareness
increased privacy concerns and reduced trust in the device straight after the
experiment, these had regressed to pre-awareness levels a month later. Our
study confirms the existence of the privacy paradox in the Saudi Arabian IoT
domain, and also reveals the limited influence awareness raising exerts on long-
term privacy concern and trust levels.
1. Introduction
The recent, relentless expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to
following forecasts: in 2025, IoT devices are expected to reach a staggering
75.44 billions, a nearly 146% increase from 2020 (30.73 billions) (Oshana and
Kraeling, 2019). Whilst highlighting the magnitude of the IoT phenomenon,
these numbers also raise concerns about the potential adverse consequences
of the global roll-out of these networked devices. The research literature em-
phasises two kinds of concerns: security vulnerabilities (Cheruvu et al., 2019;
Meneghello et al., 2019) and privacy violations (Gheisariy et al., 2019; Atlam
and Wills, 2020). The research reported here focuses on the latter.
Owners of IoT devices can make setup decisions that will potentially jeopar-
dise their privacy. This, in turn, can impact the privacy of others living in the
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same dwelling. Many installation and setup decisions are influenced by the con-
venience intrinsic to IoT deployment such as, for example, in wearable devices
(Kao et al., 2019), automotive industry (Kang et al., 2017), medical devices
(Mavrogiorgou et al., 2019), and, on a larger scale, manufacturing (Ehie and
Chilton, 2020), and smart cities (Ejaz and Anpalagan, 2019). All IoT devices
claim to improve quality of life. Yet the unspoken reality is that they also col-
lect a great deal of the owner’s information (both public and personal, both
consciously shared and unwittingly leaked).
Concerns have been expressed about IoT devices’ potential to violate per-
sonal privacy. In 2019, global organisations Consumers International and the
Internet Society surveyed consumers in Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the
UK and the US about what matters most when buying connected devices. Find-
ings highlighted that 75% of people distrusted the way data is being shared, 63%
found data collection by connected devices “creepy” and 53% did not believe
connected devices could effectively protect their privacy (Internet Society, 2019).
Intuitively, this type of evidence ought to result in an increase in behaviours
aimed at protecting privacy. However, research has shown that this is often
not the case (Hsu and Lin, 2016; Aleisa and Renaud, 2017b). This disjointed-
ness between self-reported privacy concerns and actual privacy protecting be-
haviours has been termed the “privacy paradox” (Barnes, 2006; Norberg et al.,
2007). When this manifests, those expressing concerns do not refrain from using
privacy-violating devices, and rarely make an active effort to protect their own
information (Gerber et al., 2018).
Nonetheless, research opinion related to the existence of the privacy para-
dox is not unanimous. Some studies question its nature (Trepte et al., 2014;
Mohamed and Ahmad, 2012), leading Dienlin and Trepte to refer to it as a
possible “relic of the past” (Dienlin and Trepte, 2015). Other scholars call for
more experimental studies into this phenomenon (Barth et al., 2019). This call,
the relative youth of the IoT field, and the potential of IoT devices to facilitate
serious privacy violations (given that they are used within people’s personal
spaces), led us to carry out a study into the privacy paradox in the IoT domain.
Many privacy paradox studies have used surveys and interviews to gather
evidence (Kim et al., 2019; Barth et al., 2019; Kitkowska et al., 2017; ten Berg
et al., 2019; Williams, 2018). Yet Kraemer and Flechais (2018) argue that
studies need to be carried out that merge interventions and observations to
deliver greater insights into IoT-related privacy behaviours.
One of the aspects that is likely to influence these kinds of ethnologically
valid studies is the environment, and particularly the privacy legislation that
companies have to abide by. In Europe, the GDPR regulation (2018) provides
strong privacy protection, and its influence will have pervaded society since
it was imposed in 2018. To carry out this study, therefore, we decided to
recruit participants in Saudi Arabia, where such legislation has not yet been
enacted. This eliminated one possible confounding factor from our experiment
and increased the originality of our investigation: Saudi Arabia has, in fact, not
been the topic of such a study before.
We thus extend existing privacy paradox research with an experimental
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study that: (1) raises awareness by showing people evidence of actual privacy
violations by an IoT device, (2) measures privacy concern and trust levels after
raising awareness and empirically observes actual behaviours in responding to
the newly obtained knowledge of the privacy violation (Figure 1), (3) carries out
the study in a context where the phenomenon has not been subject to an in-
vestigation before (Saudi Arabia), and (4) follows up with participants a month
later to determine whether immediate post-experiment changes in privacy con-
cern and trust levels have been sustained.
Figure 1: Studied IoT Privacy Paradox Constructs
The main purpose of this study was to unpack the relationships between
privacy concerns, trust in one particular IoT device, privacy violation awareness
and actions taken in response to such improved awareness in the Saudi Arabian
context (both short and longer term).
Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 then explains how we
designed our study, with Section 4 reporting the results of our investigation and
Section 5 discussing them. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related Research
2.1. Privacy and IoT Devices Violating Privacy
In his seminal book “Privacy and Freedom”, Alan Furman Westin defined
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is commu-
nicated to others” (Westin, 1967, p.7). This definition contains the basic com-
ponents of privacy invasions: information about someone that is shared with
others against their will.
The IoT network is considered particularly conducive to privacy invasions
(Coulter and Pan, 2018). A 2013 study by Independent Security Evaluators
(ISE) on the security of routers and Network-Attached Storage (NAS) devices
was followed up by another similar study in 2019: the researchers found out
that, in the 6-year timespan, no substantial improvements to device security
were made (Mirani et al., 2019). Violation of privacy by IoT devices does not
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only happen when vulnerabilities are exploited. In a study carried out on 81
consumer-based smart devices, it was discovered that 72 such devices shared
data with third parties who were unrelated to the original manufacturers and
all exposed information to eavesdroppers through plain-text flows (Ren et al.,
2019). Consumer-based IoT devices were also the subject of investigation in
a 2019 research project on Smart TVs and Internet-streaming devices (Moha-
jeri Moghaddam et al., 2019). By means of a smart crawler, researchers iden-
tified widespread user tracking and data collection in more than 2,000 “over-
the-top” streaming channels. Data sent to tracking websites included MAC
addresses, device serial numbers and video titles.
Poorly encrypted communications, inadequate user interfaces, or weak pass-
words often characterise the development of the IoT layers (sensors and data
collectors; data transmission control; middleware; and application and services,
(AlHogail, 2018)). Private device owners therefore run significant risks of pri-
vacy loss (Devarakonda et al., 2019; Chamarajnagar and Ashok, 2019). The
next section looks at possible solutions.
2.2. Privacy-Protecting IoT Solutions
A number of viable solutions do exist and are available to consumers. For
example, Dominikus (2011) proposed MedAssist, a privacy-preserving medical
application that provides each consumer with full control over the right of access
to their medical data. Henze et al. (2016) have introduced UPECSI (User-driven
Privacy Enforcement for Cloud-based Services), a comprehensive approach that
enables people to protect their data in transit to the cloud, and provides them
with a user-friendly interface to configure privacy settings.
Companies who sell IoT devices utilise different strategies to raise consumers’
awareness of their data collection and sharing practices. Privacy policies are
among the most common of these. However, research has found that they are
mostly ineffective, due to text complexity, lack of opt-out solutions, inadequate
timing, utilised channels, varying audiences, and irrelevant data (Schaub et al.,
2015).
Moreover, a systematic literature review (Aleisa and Renaud, 2017a) re-
vealed that solution providers tend to assume two things. The first is that new
owners will be aware of the IoT privacy-related issues, and the second that they
will be willing to deploy one of the available privacy preserving solutions.
The overwhelming majority of the 83 solutions analysed by Aleisa and Re-
naud (2017b) mandated active end-user participation. The question that de-
mands further examination is related to the extent to which people are aware
of privacy violations and, if they become aware, whether they would use a tool
that explicitly prevents such invasions.
2.3. Responses to Privacy Violations and the Role of Trust
IoT devices offer functionality benefits and enhance convenience and this
influences their owners’ privacy-protecting behaviours. Kim et al. (2019) inves-
tigated IoT devices in healthcare, smart transport and smart home services to
4
find that perceived benefit is positively associated with willingness to provide
privacy information, whilst perceived privacy risk has no significant effect on
such willingness (except for healthcare services). Zheng et al. (2018) conducted
interviews with smart home owners and reported that the convenience offered
by IoT devices influenced their privacy-related behaviours. Smart home owners
also trusted IoT device manufacturers not to violate their privacy, but did not
verify that this trust was warranted. Burgess et al. (2019) also carried out an
investigation into consumer perceptions of the value of the data being leaked by
IoT devices. They reported on a number of themes and highlighted the signifi-
cant gap in consumers’ understanding of what personal data is potentially being
leaked, who owns it, and how IoT products are using their data. They argued
for more consumer education and transparency in terms of how IoT owner data
is being, and can be, used.
On the other hand, Barth et al. (2019) reported that even those with a
heightened level of awareness of privacy violations continue to risk privacy in-
trusions. In fact, in line with the privacy paradox, privacy aspects did not
inform their participants’ use of apps, with functionality, app design and cost
being the main predictors of app selection.
A construct closely associated with security and privacy, i.e. trust, reflects
the confidence in, and expectations of, reliability, integrity, security, depend-
ability, and ability of a piece of technology (Yan et al., 2014). In the field of
IoT, user trust is a multi-faceted domain, with research that spans topics such
as psychological aspects of risk, distrust, retaliation, altruism, association and
brands (Køien, 2011).
Trust’s influence on privacy concerns and behaviours has been well researched
(Phelan et al., 2016; Barth et al., 2019). Its role has been modelled as a de-
terminant or an outcome of concern; a mediator between concern and actual
behaviours; and as a moderator of the influence of concern on actual behaviours
(Smith et al., 2011). Trust assessment is a complex endeavour, as the literature
generally acknowledges the multi-faceted nature of this construct, with assess-
able and non-assessable variables (Yan et al., 2014). The crucial role of trust
in technology adoption dynamics has been stressed (AlHogail, 2018), specifi-
cally with regards to IoT products and services (Gao and Bai, 2014) and on
third-party applications (Han et al., 2014).
The close relationship between privacy concerns, trust and information pri-
vacy behaviours (in the case of this study, privacy protection) is emphasised by
Mayer et al. (1995), who defined trust as “the willingness of a party to be vul-
nerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other
party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of
the ability to monitor or control that other party” (p. 172). This definition
is particularly relevant to this discussion, as it stresses the trade-off in which
trust seems to play the role of fulcrum: on the one hand, an expected benefit
(expectation of a particular action important to the trustor); on the other hand,
a potential vulnerability (to the trustor’s actions); in the centre: trust. In the
dynamic environment of the digital age, technological affordances have enabled
trust dynamics in a plethora of economic situations, to the point at which trust
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has been named the currency of this new digital economy (Botsman, 2017). ten
Berg et al. (2019) confirm the impact of trust, privacy concerns and perceived
benefits on people’s willingness to sacrifice their personal information in the IoT
domain.
The concepts of privacy concerns, trust in, awareness of, and responses to,
privacy violations summarised in this section have provided a framework for our
research, which we will present next.
3. Investigation in the Saudi Arabian Context
3.1. Research questions, hypotheses and conceptual framework
The following three research questions (RQ.X), with associated hypotheses
(HXn), are addressed and tested in this investigation:
RQ.A: Privacy Concerns — To what extent does a smart device owner’s
awareness of privacy violations impact their privacy concerns when using a de-
vice that does not require the upload of private data to enable its functionality?
If IoT device owners see evidence of IoT privacy violations, their privacy
concerns related to smart devices will: not change (HA0) or increase (HA1).
RQ.B: Trust in IoT devices — To what extent does a smart device owner’s
awareness of privacy violations impact their trust in a smart device that does
not require to upload private data to enable its functionality?
If IoT device owners see evidence of IoT privacy violations, their trust in the
smart device will: not change (HB0) or decrease (HB1).
RQ.C: Chosen Response Action — To what extent does a smart device
owner’s awareness of privacy violations impact their decision to act to preserve
their privacy, and the nature of the action they take. This, while using a smart
device that does not require the upload of private data to enable its primary
functionality?
If IoT device owners see evidence of IoT privacy violations, they will take
no action to prevent them (HC0), take personal preventative actions (refusal,
removal, misrepresentation) (HC1) or take public disapproval actions (direct
complaint to 3rd parties, negative word-of-mouth, complaint to manufacturer)
(HC2).
Figure 2 represents the conceptual framework of this investigation, where
participants’ awareness of IoT-related privacy violations is the independent vari-
able (IV) and people’s privacy concerns over IoT devices, their trust in IoT
devices and responses to privacy violations are the three dependent variables
(DVs).
3.2. Rationale
The experiment we report on here was carried out to determine the impact
of improved privacy violation awareness, through an educational awareness pre-
sentation. According to Khan et al. (2011), this is the second most effective
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Figure 2: The conceptual framework of the present research.
way of increasing awareness. Increasing awareness about the consequences of
personal information disclosure and providing individuals with privacy policies
should increase transparency and reduce the privacy paradox. Any disparity
between claims of privacy concerns and chosen actions will prove that the pri-
vacy paradox phenomenon manifests in the IoT domain (Williams et al., 2016).
To this end, the research team purchased a smart plug. This device’s only func-
tionality is to switch itself on or off. Hence one can expect the device to generate
very little network traffic, with the device only checking at regular intervals to
determine whether it ought to be switched on or off, as appropriate.
We positioned the researcher’s laptop so that it recorded all network traffic
(see Figure 3). Our initial investigations showed that, contrary to expectations,
the smart plug actually generated a great deal of traffic, much of which was
transmitted to addresses that we could not identify using https://whois.net.
It is reasonable to assume, first, that the device was not performing as it can
reasonably be expected to, in terms of delivering its functionality. Secondly, we
wanted to determine whether users would feel uncomfortable with the amount
of data being transmitted by a device that ought only to receive and act upon
on/off commands.
We asked participants in our experiment to use the smart plug for a 2 hour
period. While they were doing so, we monitored all web traffic, and also at-
tempted to resolve the IP addresses it communicated with. We then created a
Web-based application to provide participants with an informative data traffic
report at the end of their 2 hour stint. To complete the educational awareness
presentation, we showed them the smart device’s privacy policy. This allowed
us to measure the impact of increased awareness of potential privacy violations.
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Figure 3: Smart plug monitoring setup.
3.3. Research Design
The goal of this study was to determine the impact of increased awareness
of privacy violations associated to the usage of IoT devices on: (1) privacy
concerns, (2) trust, and (3) actioned responses (Figure 1).
This study utilised a mixed-methods approach (Field, 2013), whereby data
were collected through an interview (to introduce participants to the smart
device used during the study and the related privacy policy, and recorded par-
ticipants’ responses), a questionnaire (to measure participants’ trust in, and
privacy concerns over, the IoT device, and the action they chose to take in
response to their new awareness), and an observation (to observe and record
whether the participants read the smart device privacy policy, and the amount
of time they spent in doing so).
The target population was any smart device user over 18 years of age, of
both genders, living in Saudi Arabia, a country chosen by virtue of three main
factors.
First, Saudi Arabia experienced a recent increase in the number of owners
of smartphones (Statista, 2019) (with smartphone penetration exceeding the
international average (Thankappan, 2017)). This makes privacy violations an
issue potentially affecting a large portion of population.
Second, a study conducted by Linksys in 2018 has revealed that there had
been rapid adoption of IoT in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with an increasing
number of people consuming home smart devices (Telecom Review, 2018).
Thirdly, Saudi Arabia lacked privacy and data protection laws at the time
this research was carried out. Only the Basic Law of Governance no: A/90 is
applies to protection of the privacy of individuals (Wilkinson and Alsaab, 2019).
This allowed the research team to examine the relationships between the ex-




This research utilised three well-established models to measure its DVs.
First, privacy concerns were measured using the Internet Users Informa-
tion Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) (Malhotra et al., 2004) along three dimensions:
(1) collection of, and (2) control over, personal information; and (3) awareness
of organisational privacy practices.
Second, trust in IoT devices was measured using Cheung and Lee’s
instrument (2000) with minor modifications to match this study’s design.
Third, responses to increased awareness of privacy violations were
measured using the Information Privacy-Protective Responses taxonomy (IPPR,
with adaptations to the field of IoT) (Son and Kim, 2008). In its original
formulation, this taxonomy is also a nomological model that classifies potential
behavioural responses into three categories and six types:
• No action.
• Personal action — prevention: with one of: (1) refusal (block all traffic
to unusual IP addresses), (2) removal (remove personal information), or
(3) misrepresentation (falsify the personal information they exchange).
• Public action — disapproval: with one of: (1) complain to 3rd parties
(send an email to the third-party organisation involved in the privacy vi-
olation to voice their concerns), (2) negative word-of-mouth (voice their
concerns to friends/ relatives), or (3) direct complaint to manufacturer
(send an email to the smart devices’ manufacturers to voice their con-
cerns).
3.3.2. Experiment Steps
The experiment conducted in this study had three phases (Figure 6):
Phase 1 (Preamble): Participants:
1. read and signed the consent form.
2. were introduced to the smart device used in the experiment: a smart plug
to connect a table lamp to the WiFi network. They could switch the lamp
on and off using a smartphone app.
3. were provided with the smart device policy (Figure 4). The researcher
recorded whether participants read the policy, and, if so, how long they
spent doing so.
4. were given an open-ended “pre-awareness” questionnaire to record their
privacy concerns, using the IUIPC (Malhotra et al., 2004); Participants
were then given an open-ended questionnaire to record their level of trust
in the IoT device, using questions adapted from Cheung and Lee (2000).
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Figure 4: The Privacy Policy
Phase 2 (Experiment): The researcher installed her own PC as a man-in-
the-middle device to monitor all network traffic. A software application was
used to monitor the network traffic sent out or received by the smart device
mechanism (smart plug and smartphone) for two hours.
Participants chose to engage in either path (A) and (B), and both saw a
traffic analysis report based on data collected by the smart device and shared
with third-party companies (via unusual or unknown IP addresses). This report
depicted network traffic both when the smart device was, and was not, in active
use (one hour each).
The software on the researcher’s computer analysed the network traffice and
produced a detailed report on IP addresses (source and destination), number of
packets, total size, and host name of each packet (Figure 5).
Participants were asked whether they wanted to install the IoT device applica-
tion on their own smartphone to operate the lamp. Either, they:
(A) agreed to install the application. In this case, the participant:
(i) installed the app on their own Smartphone.
(ii) was prompted at random intervals to switch the lamp on and off,
to ensure that network traffic was generated during the first hour.
During the second hour, the participant did not use the smart device
to switch the light on or off. They continued to use their own device
for normal activities. Network traffic was monitored and recorded
throughout the two hours.
(iii) was shown the analysis of their own network traffic.
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Figure 5: The Researcher’s Data showing Volume and Destination of Traffic.
(B) did not agree, and the researcher’s data was used as evidence of IoT device
activity. In this case:
(i) the researcher used the smart device’s functionality at random in-
tervals from her own Smartphone to make sure that network traffic
was generated during the first hour. During the second hour, the re-
searcher did not actively use the smart device. Network traffic was
monitored and recorded throughout the two hours.
(ii) the participant was shown the analysis of the researcher’s network
traffic.
The experiment concluded with a final four steps. The participant:
(i) was introduced to the smart device privacy policy. This, together with
their awareness of evidence of actual network traffic reflecting privacy in-
vasion, ensured that they were well informed of actual as well as stated
privacy violations perpetrated by by the smart device.
(ii) completed the privacy concern and trust questionnaires.
(iii) indicated their chosen response to the increased awareness.
(iv) gave feedback on the experiment and asked any questions they wanted to
ask.
Phase 3 (Follow Up): A month later, those participants who had consented
were contacted and once again completed the privacy concern and trust ques-
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Figure 6: The Experiment Flow
tionnaires.
3.4. Validity, Reliability and Data Analysis
Content validity of the questionnaires (Field, 2013) was ascertained by ad-
ministering all the questionnaires to a questionnaire construction expert who
checked for common errors, such as double-barrelled, confusing, ambiguous, and
leading questions (Field, 2013). Two experts then examined the questionnaires
and provided comments on the clarity of the questions. Comments included, for
example: “I looked through the survey, and some of the questions were priming
people to answer” and “I can see a lot of thought went into this. It is look-
ing good”. Finally, three people with no technological expertise completed the
questionnaires while passing on their comments.
The experiment’s content validity was tested via internal and external va-
lidity measures (Field, 2013). The internal validity ensured that the indepen-
dent variable (awareness) influence the dependent variables (trust level, privacy
concerns, and response). It was performed by asking two people with no tech-
nological background (test group) to conduct the experiment and provide the
researcher with feedback to help improve the content and the process flow of the
experiment. Their results were also used to check whether the designed instru-
ment actually measured what it was set out to measure. The researcher found
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from the results of the test group that the unfamiliarity with the smart device
would influence the DVs. To reduce this, the researcher would introduce the
smart device (smart plug) and ask the participant to try it before commencing
with the experiment.
External validity is concerned with whether the outputs of the study can
be generalized to the target population, and the randomization needs to be
granted by ensuring that gender, age, technological background, education are
variable in the test group. In this study, three random people (test group) were
asked to engage with the experiment, and their results were tested to verify
generalizability.
Well-established measurements instruments drawn from the research litera-
ture were utilised in the present study (IUIPC) (Malhotra et al., 2004); Cheung
and Lee’s instrument (Cheung and Lee, 2000); and IPPR (Son and Kim, 2008),
which corroborates measurement validity. To verify reliability of the utilised
instrument, two randomly selected individuals were asked to conduct the exper-
iment and answer all the questionnaires twice. The outputs were checked for
similarity (test-retest reliability) and the relationship between the results of the
repeated tests were positively correlated (Field, 2013).
Collected data were stored in a MySQL database and then analysed using
IBM SPSS. Data analysis was carried out in two ways. The IV was manipulated
using the same entities and repeated measures design (Salkind, 2010). The
same group of participants were tested in their statistical perception. First,
without giving any information on their privacy whilst using a smart device;
second, giving them precise information on their privacy whilst using a smart
device; and finally, assessing their privacy concerns a month later by completing
a trust and privacy concerns open-ended questionnaire through email (Field,
2013). Second, collected data on participants’ responses to privacy violations
were analysed by manipulating the IV using different entities. Two groups of
participants had their awareness of privacy violations during usage of the smart
device increased by the researchers. Their responses to such violations were
measured and statistical analysis performed, testing the correlation between
the measured variables using a non-parametric Spearman’s correlation (Field,
2013).
3.5. Research Sample
A convenience sampling technique was employed by using volunteers as re-
search participants (Bell et al., 2018). A total of 46 individuals (36 male, 10
female; with educational backgrounds ranging from high school to doctoral stud-
ies) participated in the experiment.
Of the 46 participants, 20 agreed to download the smart device app on their
own smartphone (therefore utilising their own data for the experiment) and
26 opted to utilise the researcher’s home experiment. Thirty-four agreed to
be contacted one month after the experiment to once again measure privacy
concerns and trust in the IoT device after a month’s delay.
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The size of this sample was considered appropriate based on the fact that
the experiment took two hours, a duration that would usually discourage par-
ticipation and reduce the number of individuals in an experimental sample.
3.6. Privacy Concerns and Trust Measurements
Having ensured that the questionnaires were validated, each participant’s
privacy concerns using the IoT smart device were measured three times: (1) be-
fore the commencement of the experiment, (2) after making participants aware
of the privacy violations committed by the smart device (n=46), and (3) a
month after the end of the experiment (n=34), using the IUIPC 10-item scale
(Malhotra et al., 2004). A seven-point Likert scale was used, ranging from 1
(minimum concern) to 7 (maximum concern).
Similar to privacy concerns, each participant’s level of trust in the IoT smart
device was measured before and after making participants aware of the privacy
violations perpetrated via the smart device, and a month after the end of the
experiment, using Cheung and Lee’s 13-item scale instrument (Cheung and
Lee, 2000). A seven-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (minimum trust) to 7
(maximum trust).
4. Results
None of the participants read the privacy policy provided with the smart
device during the experiment preamble. The preamble was implemented as a
sequence of web pages, which participants could complete or click through, as
they preferred.
4.1. RQ.A: Privacy Concerns
Our findings highlight the fact that participants had high levels of concern
about their data across the three categories of privacy concerns, namely (1)
control, (2) awareness of privacy practices, and (3) data collection, even be-
fore the researcher disclosed privacy violations perpetrated by the smart device
(avg=5.86957).
Concerns increased slightly when the participants were made aware of the
smart device privacy violation (avg=6.15651) and decreased slightly, even below
pre-awareness levels, a month after the experiment (avg=5.77942). Figure 7
illustrates participants’ privacy concerns. The vertical axis reflects the score
on the seven-point Likert scale, while the horizontal axis corresponds to the
measurement instrument questions.
An analysis of the differences around privacy concerns between participants
(n=20) who agreed to utilise their own smartphone (i.e. their own data) and
those who opted to utilise the researcher’s data (n=26) demonstrated that pri-
vacy concerns before awareness were basically the same. However, participants
who generated their own data visualisation demonstrated significantly higher
levels of privacy concern after awareness; such concerns slightly decreased a
month after the experiment, yet stayed higher than the other group’s (Figure
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Figure 7: The privacy concerns before, and after the experiment.
8). The reason for the minor increase in the participants’ privacy concerns could
be due to these participants already being aware of IoT privacy issues. The pre-
cise information provided during the experiment made them even more aware of
the potential privacy violations related to the specific IoT device (Smart Plug).
4.2. RQ.B: Trust in IoT devices
The responses demonstrated a very significant decrease in trust (avg=2.66052)
as compared to before they became aware of the privacy violations perpetrated
by the smart device (avg=5.18729). Trust levels increased when measured again
a month after the experiment, but not to initial levels (avg=4.78732). Figure 9
illustrates participants’ trust in the IoT smart device: the vertical axis reflects
the score on the seven-point Likert scale, while the horizontal axis each of the
thirteen questions of the measurement instrument.
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Figure 8: Differences in privacy concerns between participants who used the smart plug
themselves to generate their own traffic report, and participants who viewed the researcher’s
traffic report.
Trust levels in participants (n=20) who agreed to use their own smartphones
during the experiment, and those who preferred to use the researcher’s home
experiment (n=26), were slightly higher, before awareness, in the latter group.
However, after being informed of the privacy violations, the situation changed:
participants who used their own data had higher levels of trust than the other
group. The scenario changed again one month after the experiment, when par-
ticipants who used the researcher’s home experiment results had their trust
bounce back to pre-awareness levels (Figure 10). The trust levels before and a
month after the experiment demonstrate a small variation (about 0.3), which
could indicate that knowledge of the privacy invasion will produce a brief dis-
trusting attitude that will fade over time if the smart device features are still
enticing.
4.3. RQ.C: Chosen Response Action
Once the privacy violations were revealed to the participants, they were given
the opportunity to respond, adopting one of seven actions, which we will restate
here for the sake of clarity: refusal, removal, and misrepresentation (preventative
actions); negative word-of-mouth, direct and indirect complaint (disapproval
actions); and no response. Our findings show that of the participants (n=46),
39.1% opted to execute private action, 32.6% chose no response, and the rest
went for public action.
The results also showed that the participants who chose not to use their own
data during the experiment tended not to respond (28.3% of a total 56.5%). On
the other hand, 17.4% participants adopted preventative actions, and 10.8%
participants adopted disapproval actions. Also, the participants who used their
own data during the experiment had a greater tendency to act to prevent the
potential privacy violation. 28.2% of participants adopted preventative actions,
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Figure 9: Trust before, after and a month after awareness raising.
10.8% participants adopted disapproval actions, and 4.3% participants chose
not to take any action. Figure 11 provides details on the responses selected by
participants.
Of the 46 total participants, those who chose to use the researcher’s data
mainly preferred not to respond to the privacy violation (n=13). Participants
that used their own data mainly opted to remove their private data (n=8).
4.3.1. Free Text Responses
Participants were asked to provide reasons for their choices and 16 chose to
elaborate on this. In terms of private action, removal (n=7) was selected as
the best way to balance the need to protect some personal information with the
convenience of a smart device, as illustrated in this sample answer:
“Because I still want to use the device in a way that is safe, and to
keep my important information protected.”
Negative word-of-mouth was adopted as a response to privacy violations in
an altruistic fashion, in an attempt to warn others of the issues:
“Because I have a large following on Twitter, so a lot of people will
be aware about the privacy issues with smart devices.”
Misrepresentation was selected for similar reasons to removal, i.e. to balance
privacy and convenience:
“I value my privacy but I love the features of smart devices. This
option may give me both.”
17
Figure 10: Differences in trust between participants who used their own data, and participants
who used the researcher’s data.
Refusal was chosen in an unconditional attempt to stop leakage of personal
information:
“Because I must stop the leaking of information [. . . ] to unknown
sources.”
In terms of public action, direct complaint was selected in the belief that
voicing disappointment would cause the manufacturer to better protect con-
sumers’ privacy:
“Because I believe they will respond and change their way of treating
my personal data”.
The research team also investigated the reasons for some participants not
taking action (no response) following awareness of privacy violations (n=15): 7
participants stated that they enjoyed the convenience of smart devices which
offset the downsides of privacy violations; 4 stated that they trusted their smart
devices despite the violations; and 4 stated that they found the process for
protecting their privacy difficult to understand.
4.4. Analysis of Relationships between Constructs
In the present study, we hypothesised that awareness of privacy violations
(IV) changes the relationships existing between privacy concerns, trust, and re-
sponse (DVs). To test these moderating effects, we utilised a repeated measures
design (Field, 2013) with one group of participants, by testing the effects of in-
creasing the IoT privacy awareness on privacy concerns, trust and response levels
18
Figure 11: Participants’ responses to privacy violations.
of the same group of participants. Standardised values for the DVs were created
and, from these, three bivariate correlated relationships were posited applying a
non-parametric Spearman’s correlation (Field, 2013). The non-parametric test
was chosen to match the data’s non-normal distribution, based on normality dis-
tribution tests being conducted and indicating deviation from normality (e.g. p
< .05).
Results (see Appendix B) showed that privacy concern was positively asso-
ciated with trust before intervention on the IV (privacy violations’ awareness),
with a significant coefficient (r=.352). Manipulation of the IV led to a negative
correlation between trust and privacy concerns, with the former decreasing and
the latter increasing (r=-.323).
On the other hand, the relationship coefficient among privacy concern, trust
and response was too low to be significant (r=-.088; r=-.045). Finally, a month
after the end of the experiment, trust was negatively related to privacy concern,
with the former increasing and the latter decreasing (r=-.389).
Consequently, multiple Wilcoxon signed-rank, Chi-Square, and one-variable
tests (Field, 2013) were conducted to test the hypotheses and provide answers to
our research questions. Test results are contained in Appendix C (privacy con-
cerns), Appendix D (trust), and Appendix E (participants’ chosen responses).
4.4.1. Kinds of Data
To enrich the data, the researchers asked a participants to provide details on
the kinds of personal information that they deemed most sensitive, and hence
worth protecting. Participants who selected removal and misrepresentation were
required to indicate what personal information they wanted protected at all
costs. Credit card details, video recordings, photos and national ID cards were
the most often named four categories. Hang et al. (2012) carried out a study to
identify the kinds of data people were willing to share. Their participants were
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less concerned about sharing timetables, web browsers or camera apps than
email, notes, contacts, photos and text messages.
4.5. Considering the Research Questions and Hypotheses
Here, we will report on the research questions and the validated hypotheses.
RQ.A: Privacy Concerns. To what extent does a smart device owner’s
awareness of privacy violations impact their privacy concerns when using a de-
vice that does not require the upload of private data to enable its functionality?
If IoT device owners see evidence of IoT privacy violations, their privacy
concerns related to smart devices will: not change (HA0) or increase (HA1).
The difference between the participants’ privacy concerns in the three phases
of the experiment (before and after increasing awareness and one month after the
experiment concluded) was tested using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Privacy
concern levels were slightly higher after increasing the privacy awareness than
before (Mdn = 6.3 vs. Mdn = 6; r=-0.377, p < .05). One month after the
experiment, privacy concerns decreased to a lower level than before awareness
(Mdn = 5.8; r=-0.248, p < .05). Privacy concerns levels also decreased slightly
from right after the experiment to a month later = .312) (Asymp. Sig. 2-tailed)
(Appendix C).
In conclusion, HA1 was validated straight after increasing the level of aware-
ness, but HA0 was validated in the longer term (a month after the experiment).
RQ.B: Trust in IoT devices. To what extent does a smart device owner’s
awareness of privacy violations impact their trust in a smart device that does
not require to upload private data to enable its functionality?
If people see evidence of IoT privacy violations, their trust in the smart
device will: not change (HB0) or decrease (HB1). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
was also utilised to test the trust levels across the experiment. Trust levels were
significantly higher before increasing privacy awareness than after (Mdn = 5.6
vs. Mdn = 2.3; r=-0.606, p < .05). Trust levels also significantly increased from
right after the experiment to one month later (Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) = .063)
(Appendix D).
In conclusion, HB1 was supported straight after increasing awareness levels,
but HB0 was supported in the longer term (one month after the experiment).
RQ.C: Chosen Response Action. To what extent does a smart device
owner’s awareness of privacy violations impact their decision to act to pre-
serve their privacy, and the nature of the action they take. This, while using
a smart device that does not require the upload of private data to enable its
primary functionality?
If people see evidence of IoT privacy violations, they will: take NO action
to prevent them (HC0), take preventative actions (Refusal, Misrepresentation,
Removal) (HC1) or take disapproval actions (Negative word-of-mouth, Direct
complaint, Indirect complaint) (HC2). A Chi-Squared, one-variable test was
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conducted to test the participants’ responses to privacy violations. HC0 was
rejected as the value of p < .05 (Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) = 0.024) (Appendix E).
In conclusion, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that HC2 was supported.
Table 1 summarises the findings of this study.
Table 1: Hypotheses Summary




Privacy Before Awareness 5.86 HA1 HA0
Concerns After Awareness 6.15
A Month Later 5.77
Trust Before Awareness 5.18 HB1 HB0
After Awareness 2.66
A Month Later 4.78
Response Before Awareness 32.6% HC2 (disapproval actions)
After Awareness 17.4%
A Month Later 49.9%
5. Discussion
Our research showed that participants’ concerns and trust in IoT devices
changed after their awareness of actual privacy invasions was raised. However,
a month after the experiment, privacy concerns and trust regressed to pre-
awareness levels.
Data Types: Among the personal information around which participants
were most concerned was information that clearly identified them, such as credit
card details, video recordings, photos and ID documents. This finding confirms
prior research emphasising that consumers seek anonymity to protect their data
(55% of Internet users opt for this solution) (Rainie et al., 2013). Trust in the
IoT smart device was significantly higher before awareness raising (avg=5.18),
an element further confirmed by the fact that none of the 46 participants read
the privacy policy provided with the smart device during the preamble phase.
Explaining the Findings: An explanation of this level of trust is offered by
the literature suggesting the determinant role of perceived benefits in assessing
the risks associated with privacy violations (Hsu and Lin, 2016; Barth et al.,
2019). In essence, convenience and benefits accruing from use of IoT devices
have, so far, outweighed their owners’ concerns. This is reminiscent of the role
of perceived usefulness in the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989). At
a deeper level of analysis, however, our findings seem to confirm the activation
of the privacy paradox stemming from behavioural economics disciplines.
Phelan et al. (2016) explain the privacy paradox by splitting privacy concerns
into two components: intuitive concerns (stemming from Kahneman’s System 1
way of thinking (Kahneman, 2003): fast, automatic processes) and considered
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concerns (stemming from Kahneman’s System 2 way of thinking (Kahneman,
2003): which are driven by a reasoned, deliberate process where judgements
derive from logic and rationality. According to this perspective, considered
concerns are time consuming so the privacy paradox derives from a failure to
engage in a time consuming consideration of one’s actions. Choi et al. (2018)
argue that people are suffering from privacy fatigue, leading to disengagement
and a failure to carry out privacy protecting behaviours.
Privacy Policies: In our research, participants’ failure to read the privacy
policy provided with the IoT smart device appears to confirm that the partici-
pants were guided by System 1 thinking, associated with intuitive concerns (the
privacy policy being too long and complicated to be worth reading). This also
confirms what Herley (2009) argues: that people engage in perfectly rational
trade-offs based on the excessive effort required to take action.
The research literature argues that the digital world, with its fast-paced
rhythm, has pushed individuals towards System 1 thinking even more (Kahne-
man, 2003) and the widespread diffusion of the IoT seems to exacerbate this
trend. As illustrated in Figure 4, we formulated the privacy policy in a typically
wordy, vague and non-plain language, to epitomise the nature of most privacy
policies attached to IoT smart devices1. We did not ask participants why they
did not read the privacy policy; our observation of non-reading confirms those
of other researchers (Vila et al., 2003; Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). Expla-
nations for this neglect include expectations of poor understandability (Pierce
et al., 2018; Paul et al., 2018), and a sense of helplessness (Fast and Jago, 2019),
reading these being a nuisance and an obstacle in the way of goal satisfaction
(Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018).
They might also have been eager to conclude the experiment in the least
amount of time, or may have trusted the experimenter and thought that read-
ing the policy would implicitly insult her. Regardless of the reasons, our inves-
tigation does emphasise the importance of user-friendliness in the design and
drafting of IoT smart devices’ privacy policies, a recommendation also made in
recent research (Cha et al., 2018) and promoted through legislation (Vijayan,
2005). A clear and credible privacy policy (as noted by Vijayan (2005)) could
help vendors to build more positive relationships with consumers.
Bounded Rationality: Our study also confirms findings from the be-
havioural economics literature, in particular around the concept of bounded
rationality. Decisions are affected by heuristic and cognitive preferences such as
optimism and affection bias, overconfidence, benefit heuristics or exaggerated
discounting (Strough et al., 2011). Our participants demonstrated a degree
of uncertainty in how they assessed privacy violations by the IoT smart de-
vice, either because of incomplete information (how would they know what use
third-party companies would make of their personal information?) or cognitive




device influence the assessment of risks associated with privacy violations?)
(Kehr et al., 2015).
Durability of Concern and Trust Adjustments: At the commence-
ment of the experiment, we used Cheung and Lee’s instrument (2000) to mea-
sure participants’ level of trust and to assess how our IV (privacy awareness)
impacted this. Our research showed that privacy concerns increased and trust
levels decreased after privacy violations were disclosed. This answers a question
yet to be addressed in the literature: “how long would it take for an end-user
to lower their concern threshold and re-establish their trust in a smart device
after becoming aware of a privacy violation?” Our study sets the threshold
at, or less than, a month, after which privacy concerns and trust rebounded to
pre-violation awareness levels.
In Summary: Two practical implications emerge from this. First, from an
organisational perspective, companies willing to monitor employees’ attitudes
towards smart devices and to identify instances of negligence (e.g., improper us-
age leading to leakage of personal information) may want to organise ‘refresher
training’ once a month, to ensure a ‘healthy level of concern’ is maintained. Sec-
ond, from a business perspective, organisations willing to recover from adverse
publicity deriving from unwanted disclosure of consumers’ personal information
need to focus their restoration efforts within the month after the adverse event.
5.1. Chosen Responses to Increased Privacy Violation Awareness
While previous studies have indicated that privacy issues have a significant
impact on consumers’ willingness to utilise IoT devices, our research confirms
more recent findings on the unreliability of responses flowing from this impact
(Hsu and Lin, 2016).
From a theoretical perspective, our investigation has expanded our under-
standing of how people respond to evidence of privacy violations. The fact that
only 3 participants, out of 46, unconditionally discontinued usage of the IoT
smart device (refusal) and 28 decided to protect their privacy, yet without sac-
rificing the smart features offered by the device using disapproval actions. This
indicates that the perceived benefits of the smart device were still too high for
owners to sacrifice its functionality. This is consistent with the literature on
the so-called privacy calculus which suggests that when comparing risks and
benefits, individuals often underestimate the former and overestimate the lat-
ter (Kim et al., 2019; Pavlou, 2011; Kehr et al., 2015). Lack of a legislative
framework to promote privacy protection could be another factor to consider
in the bigger picture. Saudi Arabia currently has no specific data protection
legislation, except for laws grounded in the principles of governance and sector-
specific legislative instruments (Royal Order No. (A/91), 1992). These laws are
not designed to protect consumers in the case of IoT privacy infringement cases
(Alsulaiman and Alrodhan, 2014). Participants in our study largely decided not
to act when informed of the privacy violations perpetrated by the IoT smart
device. Yet, we could hypothesise that the existence of a legislative framework
obliging public and private organisations to take proactive actions to better
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protect people’s privacy (with significant penalties to punish abuse) might well
increase willingness to respond.
5.2. Limitations and Future Research
The main limitation of this study resides in its sample, confined to a specific
geographical area, and relatively small in size. This could translate to reduced
generalisability of the findings. Level of analysis was another limiting factor.
Since this study was based on privacy concerns and trust as antecedents to
participants’ responses to privacy violations, there could potentially be more
factors coming into play, such as, for example, individual background, age,
gender, social and milieu influences, personality traits, etc. We suggest further
research to examine the impact of these additional variables to expand our
understanding of attitudes vis-á-vis IoT smart devices and privacy violations.
Responding to calls in the literature for a less logically centred approach to
such investigations (Hsu and Lin, 2016), our study has focused on individual
and socially constructed factors. We believe this is a promising avenue for future
research.
5.3. Ethics
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of [Anony-
mised]. In particular, this required the research team to offer alternative paths
(A) and (B) during the experiment, so that people could still participate even
if they did not want to install the IoT device app on their own smartphones.
This respected their need to preserve their own privacy but still to be informed
of potential privacy violations. All responses provided in this investigation were
treated anonymously and participants’ network traffic analysis was deleted at
the end of the experiment.
6. Conclusion
The privacy paradox is a well known phenomenon, reflecting the puzzling
mismatch between stated privacy concerns and the absence of actual privacy
protecting behaviours.
We wanted to determine whether this would also manifest in the IoT domain.
We thus carried out a study to determine what actions people would choose to
carry out in the face of evidence of actual privacy violations committed by an
IoT device. Our participants were shown evidence of potential privacy leakage
by a smart plug, then we asked them to choose an action, which ranged from
discontinuing usage to mere disapproval. We also measured privacy concerns
and trust both before and after they saw this evidence.
Our participants generally did not want to discontinue using the device, most
preferring to express their disapproval while retaining the device. While their
privacy concerns increased and trust decreased immediately after the experi-
ment, both regressed to pre-awareness levels a month later.
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Our findings confirm that the privacy paradox also manifests in the IoT do-
main. This is particularly concerning because these devices are in our homes,
our most personal and private spaces, and have the potential to commit the
worst kinds of privacy invasions. It is clear that a mere increase in awareness is
not going to convince everyone to take action to preserve their privacy. Aware-
ness, on its own, is often insufficient to prompt action. As a next step, we
ought to experiment with different ways of motivating people to take action to
prevent these kinds of privacy invasions, and no longer näıvely put our faith in
increasing awareness.
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Appendix A. Construct Measurement Questions
Appendix A.1. Trust in IoT Measurement
Here are some statements about personal information. From the standpoint
of personal privacy, please indicate the extent to which you, as an individual,
agree or disagree with each statement by circling the appropriate number. Each
of the items is followed by a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly
disagree“ and “strongly agree”.
Table A.2: Trust Questions
1. Internet of Things vendors implement security measures to protect their users.
2. Internet of Things vendors have the ability to verify Internet of Things users’
identity for security purpose.
3. Internet of Things vendors usually ensure that transactional information is pro-
tected from accidentally altered or destroyed during transmission on the Internet.
4. Internet of Things vendors will not sell my personal information to the third parties
without my permission.
5. Internet of Things vendors concern about consumers privacy.
6. Internet of Things vendors will not divulge consumers personal data to other parties.
7. I feel safe about the privacy control of Internet of Things vendors.
8. It is easy for me to trust a person/thing.
9. My tendency to trust a person/thing is high.
10. I tend to trust a person/thing, even though I have little knowledge of it.
11. Trusting someone or something is not difficult.
12. Using the smart devices has been a good experience to me personally.
13. I have positive experiences of using the smart devices.
Appendix A.2. Response Actions
Figure A.12: Offering Participants a Choice of Response Actions
Due to space limitations we direct the reader to [Anonymised for Review] for
details of exactly what the interface looked like for each of these chosen
options.
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Appendix A.3. Privacy Concerns to IoT Measurement
Here are some statements about personal information. From the standpoint
of personal privacy, please indicate the extent to which you, as an individual,
agree or disagree with each statement by circling the appropriate number.* Each
of the items is followed by a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly
disagree” and “strongly agree”.
Table A.3: Privacy Concern Questions
Control
1. Consumer online privacy is really a matter of consumers’ right to exercise con-
trol and autonomy over decisions about how their information is collected, used, and
shared.
2. Consumer control of personal information lies at the heart of consumer privacy.
3. I believe that online privacy is invaded when control is lost or unwillingly reduced
as a result of a marketing transaction. Awareness (of privacy practices):
Awareness
1. Companies seeking information online should disclose the way the data are col-
lected, processed, and used.
2. A good consumer online privacy policy should have a clear and conspicuous dis-
closure.
3. It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about how my
personal information will be used.
Collection
1. It usually bothers me when companies ask me for personal information.
2. When online companies ask me for personal information, I sometimes think twice
before providing it.
3. It bothers me to give personal information to so many online companies.
4. I’m concerned that online companies are collecting too much personal information
about me.
Appendix B. Tests of moderating effects among variables
















Sig. (2-tailed) . .016
N 46 46










Trust A Mean Correlation
Coefficient
1.000 -.323* -.088
Sig (2-tailed) . .029 .561






Sig (2-tailed) .029 . .766




Sig (2-tailed) .561 .766 1.000
N 46 46 46
Table B.5: Relationship between trust, privacy concerns and responses after awareness.




Trust M Mean Correlation
Coefficient
1.000 -.389*
Sig. (2-tailed) . .023
N 14 34
Trust B Mean Correlation
Coefficient
-.389 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .
N 34 34
Table B.6: Relationship between trust and privacy concerns a month after awareness raising.









Negative Ranks 9a 20.61 185.50




after Awareness - Privacy
Concern before Awareness
Negative Ranks 19d 16.74 318.00




after Awareness - Privacy
Concern After Awareness
Negative Ranks 22g 16.41 361.00
Positive Ranks 9h 15.00 135.00
Ties 3i
Total 34
a. PCAA < PCBA; b. PCAA > PCBA; c. PCAA = PCBA; d. PCMAA < PCBA;
e. PCMAA > PCBA; f. PCMAA = PCBA; g. PCMAA < PCAA; h. PCMAA >
PCAA; i. PCMAA = PCAA;
Table C.7: Ranks (PCAW=Privacy Concern After Awareness; PCBA=Privacy Concern Be-




























a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; b Based on negative ranks; c Based on positive ranks
Table C.8: Test statistics.
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Appendix D. Trust – Wilcoxon signed-rank test outputs
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Trust after Awareness -
Trust before Awareness
Negative Ranks 44a 23.45 1032.50




Awareness - Trust After
Awareness
Negative Ranks 23d 15.80 363.50






Negative Ranks 1g 2.00 2.00
Positive Ranks 33h 17.97 593.00
Ties 0i
Total 34
a. TAA < TBA; b. TAA > TBA; c. TAA = TBA; d. TMAW < TBA; e. TMAW >
TBA; f. TMAW = TBA; g. TMAW < TAA; h. TMAW > TAA; i. TMAW = TAA
Table D.9: Trust ranks (TAA=Trust After Awareness; TBA=Trust Before Awareness;
TMAA=Trust Month After Awareness).
Trust After Aware-





















a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; b Based on negative ranks; c Based on positive ranks
Table D.10: Trust test statistics.
Appendix E. Participants’ responses and responses categories – Chi-
Squared, one-variable test outputs
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Observed N Expected N Residual
Refusal 3 6.6 -3.6
Removal 13 6.6 6.4
Misrepresentation 5 6.6 -1.6




Negative Word of Mouth 5 6.6 -1.6
Complaining to 3rd Party
Orgs
2 6.6 -4.6
No Response 15 6.6 8.4
Total 46
Table E.11: Participant behavioural responses.
Responses Asymp. Sig. .000
Chi-Square 24.913a Exact Sig .000
df 6 Point Probability .000
a 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies; less than 5. The minimum expected cell
frequency is 6.6.
Table E.12: Test statistics.
Response Category Expected N Residual
Public Action 5 11.5 -6.5
Private Action 18 11.5 6.5
Information Provision 8 11.5 -3.5
No Action 15 11.5 3.5
Total 46
Table E.13: Participant behavioural response categories.
Response Category Asymp. Sig. .024
Chi-Square 9.478a Exact Sig .022
df 3 Point Probability .002
a 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies; less than 5. The minimum expected cell
frequency is 11.6.
Table E.14: Test statistics.
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